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“I Know I Know It, I Know I Saw It” : The Stability of
the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship Across Domains
Brian H. Bornstein, Department of Psychology, Louisiana State University
Douglas J. Zickafoose, Department of Psychology, Louisiana State University

If the relationship between confidence and accuracy extended across domains, then one could assess performance in a known domain and use it to estimate performance in another domain. The stability of the confidence-accuracy relationship across the domains of eyewitness memory and general knowledge was investigated. The major findings of Experiment 1 were that in both domains participants were overconfident, yet more
confident on correct than on incorrect responses, and that the degrees of overconfidence, calibration, and resolution in the 2 domains were positively correlated. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and showed that
feedback about overconfidence reduced overall confidence levels but did not improve calibration or resolution.
The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of metamemory and individual differences.

Jurors tend to place a great deal of emphasis on witness confidence in determining witness credibility (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Luus
& Wells, 1994b). Previous research, though, has indicated that witness confidence is only a weak (albeit statistically reliable) predictor of accuracy, with participants
generally being overconfident (Berger & Herringer,
1991; Sharp, Cutler, & Penrod, 1988; Smith, Kassin, &
Ellsworth, 1989; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995).

In addition, confidence and accuracy are influenced
by different factors (Luus & Wells, 1994a). This presents a problem, in that jurors may be placing too much
emphasis on testimony that is not reliable (Lindsay,
1994). What is needed is a better way to predict witness
accuracy.
One possible way would be to determine characteristics of witnesses that are predictive of their accuracy.
Deffenbacher (1991) reviewed the literature on the effect of various demographic characteristics on eyewitness reliability and concluded that, with the exception
of age, they have only a negligible effect. Deffenbacher
concluded that personality traits also have little power to
predict either face recognition or event recall, although
more recent research (e.g., Hosch, 1994; Kassin, Rigby,
& Castillo, 1991) has been somewhat more promising
in this respect. For example, Hosch found that high selfmonitors are better at face recognition than low selfmonitors and that elements of cognitive style, such as
field independence, may be predictive of eyewitness accuracy as well. However, evidence supporting the effect
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of cognitive styles is mixed (Christiaansen, Ochalek, &
Sweeney, 1984; Hosch, 1994).
Another possible way to ascertain how well one’s
accuracy matches up with one’s confidence would be
to determine a witness’s confidence–accuracy (C-A)
relationship in another domain. The most common
domain, other than eyewitness memory (EM), used
for testing the C-A relationship is participants’ confidence in their general, factual knowledge (e.g., Koriat
& Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff,
1980; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; Sniezek, Paese, &
Switzer, 1990). The most prevalent finding of these
studies is that, as in EM, confidence is a weakly reliable predictor of accuracy, with participants generally being overconfident (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, &
Phillips, 1982). Attempts to discover individual differences in the C-A relationship for general knowledge
(GK) questions have also been largely unsuccessful
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Nelson, 1988; Thompson &
Mason, 1996).
There are many ways to measure the C-A relationship, but they generally fall under the headings of either
“absolute” or “relative” monitoring effectiveness (Koriat
& Goldsmith, 1996; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; Nelson,
1996; Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). Absolute measures
refer to the correspondence between a person’s subjective confidence and the proportion correct, such as over/
underconfidence and calibration. Over/underconfidence
compares a person’s mean confidence rating to that person’s overall accuracy. For example, someone who answers 50% of a set of questions correctly but whose
mean confidence rating for that set of questions is 80%
would be considered overconfident. In the case of calibration, 1 a person would be well calibrated if approximately 70% of all confidence judgments of 70% were
actually correct. The main difference between calibration and over/underconfidence is that the former uses
the mean of the squared deviations, whereas the latter
simply uses the mean deviation. As such, the over/underconfidence measure provides the direction of the relationship in addition to the magnitude, as provided by
calibration.
Neither of these two measures is able to assess the extent to which confidence distinguishes correct from incorrect answers, which is the hallmark of relative monitoring measures. Resolution accomplishes this purpose
by correlating a person’s subjective confidence with the
correctness of each answer. According to Nelson (1984),
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the best available measure of resolution is the Goodman–Kruskal gamma correlation, γ. Confidence is positively correlated with accuracy if it is greater for correct
than for incorrect responses.
Most of the previous research addressing the C-A
relationship has been concerned with absolute monitoring effectiveness, particularly the finding of overconfidence. However, as can be seen from the above
discussion, absolute monitoring effectiveness is something quite different from relative monitoring effectiveness (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). The difference between the two can be illustrated by people who assign
the same confidence level to all of their answers, such
as 50%. If these people answered half of a set of questions correctly, then they would show good absolute
monitoring effectiveness: They are neither over- nor
underconfident (mean confidence and overall accuracy
both equal 50%), and they are also perfectly calibrated.
However, they would exhibit extremely poor relative
monitoring effectiveness because the correct and incorrect responses would both have the exact same confidence ratings.
Despite findings of overconfidence in both the eyewitness and GK areas, surprisingly little research has
addressed the relationship between the two domains.
Perfect and colleagues (Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Perfect, Watson, & Wagstaff, 1993) compared participants’
performance on eyewitness and GK questionnaires.
They found that participants were equally overconfident in both domains; however, they did not assess the
stability of overconfidence across domains within individual participants. Some support for the notion of
cross-domain stability comes from a study by West and
Stanovich (1997), who found a significantly positive
correlation between participants’ degrees of overconfidence in their performance on a GK and on a motor
skill task.
Along these same lines, Nelson and Narens (1990)
termed the ascription of confidence judgments to information that is retrieved from memory—which is what

1

The Brier score partition for calibration is 1/N Σ n(r − c)2
, where N is the total number of probability assessments, n
is the number of probabilities for each category, r is the numerical value of the probabilities for each category, and c is
the proportion of probabilities for each category that were attached to the correct alternative.
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participants in eyewitness studies are typically asked
to do—retrospective metamemory. They identified systematic processes in how people make such judgments
about the contents of their memories. Thus, monitoring effectiveness in the eyewitness domain can be
construed as part and parcel of a larger system that is
involved in monitoring memory’s contents. Overconfidence in such metamemory judgments might be a relatively stable individual characteristic, similar to cognitive styles such as field independence (Hosch, 1994). If
there is a relationship between the degree of overconfidence in the EM domain and the other domain that
is used, one could see whether a person was generally
over- or underconfident and then generalize to the witnessed event.
The present experiments are an attempt to extend research on the C-A relationship by exploring the stability of individuals’ absolute and relative monitoring effectiveness across domains. Of special interest is the
question of whether individuals who are good monitors
in one domain will likewise tend to be good monitors in
the other domain. Finally, we seek to extend the findings
of cross-domain stability (West & Stanovich, 1997) by
examining the effect that feedback in one domain has on
performance in the other domain.
Experiment 1
Given that overconfidence has been found for both
GK questions and EM, the main purpose of this study
was to determine whether individuals would be stable
in their absolute monitoring (i.e., calibration and over/
underconfidence) and relative monitoring effectiveness
(i.e., resolution) across domains. Participants witnessed
a naturalistic event in which two confederates made announcements (cf. Christiaansen et al., 1984). They then
completed two unrelated questionnaires, one for GK and
one for EM.
On the basis of previous research, we predicted that
participants would be overconfident in both the GK domain (Koriat et al., 1980; Liberman & Tversky, 1993;
Sniezek et al., 1990) and the eyewitness domain (Berger
& Herringer, 1991; Perfect et al., 1993; Smith et al.,
1989; Sporer et al., 1995). Second, on the basis of research in both domains showing participants generally
to be more confident on correct responses than on incorrect responses (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham,
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1987; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Smith et al., 1989), we
predicted positive gamma correlations for both GK and
memory for witnessed details. Third, research that has
found consistency in overconfidence across different
domains (e.g., West & Stanovich, 1997) led us to predict that participants’ absolute monitoring effectiveness would be stable across the two domains. Finally,
although some research has failed to find evidence of stability in resolution across items within a single domain
(Nelson, 1988; Thompson & Mason, 1996), findings of
stable, systematic processes in people’s monitoring abilities in general (Nelson & Narens, 1990)—coupled with
the role of personality variables in EM (Hosch, 1994)—
led us to the somewhat more tentative prediction of a
positive correlation across domains for relative monitoring effectiveness.
Method
Participants
Participants were volunteers from an introductory
psychology course at Louisiana State University who received extra course credit. Of the 181 participants who
completed the GK questionnaire in Phase 1 of the study,
64 did not provide complete data for analysis, leaving
117 participants for the main analyses.2 These participants’ performance on the GK questionnaire in Phase 1
was compared with that of the 64 participants who were
dropped or who did not show up for Phase 2; this comparison yielded no significant differences. Although participants were informed that they would only receive
credit for participating in both phases, they were not
otherwise forewarned of the importance of the second

2A

total of 14 participants were dropped for providing unusable data, and 50 participants did not attend Phase 2 of the experiment. Although the number of participants from Phase 1
who did not appear for Phase 2 seems high, it is actually better than the department-wide show-up rate (about 55%) for
the semester in which this study was conducted. Another possible reason for this attrition rate may be because Phase 1 was
conducted in the first class meeting of the semester, and some
of the participants may have dropped the class before Phase 2,
thus having no incentive for the extra credit they would have
received. The relatively high attrition rate is rectified in Experiment 2.
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phase. This was done to keep the study as naturalistic as
possible, but it may also explain the relatively high attrition rate.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two phases: a GK
phase followed by an EM phase. In Phase 1, two confederates addressed an introductory psychology class.
One confederate was introduced by the instructor and
made an announcement. That confederate then introduced the other confederate, who administered the GK
questionnaire. The participants were exposed to both
confederates for about 25 min, and each confederate
spoke for approximately the same amount of time. In
Phase 2, at intervals of either 2 (N = 70), 5 (N = 22), or
7 (N = 25) days later, participants were given the EM
questionnaire.3
Materials
The study included two measures: A GK questionnaire and an EM questionnaire. Both questionnaires
consisted of 46 four-alternative forced-choice questions.
Each question was followed by a confidence scale that
ranged from 25% (the probability of a correct response
by guessing) to 100% by intervals of five. The questions
represented a range of difficulty from 7% to 75% correct
for the GK questionnaire and from 3% to 100% for the
EM questionnaire.
The following are examples of the GK and EM
questions:
GK: Ambergris comes from a:
A. Cow		
C. Antelope		

B. Sperm Whale
D. Elephant

EM: The color of the speaker’s shirt was:
A. Blue 		
C. Green		

B. Gray
D. Red

Results
The participants’ overall mean percentage correct
and mean confidence were computed for each measure. These means are presented in Table 1, which also
shows mean confidence levels on the correct and incorrect responses, mean calibration scores (in all analyses,
this score refers to the calibration component of the
Brier partition; see Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977),
and mean Goodman–Kruskal gamma correlations for
each measure. One-way analyses of variance failed to
find differences on any of the eyewitness measures that
were due to delay, Fs(2, 115) < 1.6, ps > .05, so the
data were collapsed across delay intervals for further
analysis.
GK Questionnaire
Overall means of confidence and accuracy indicated
overconfidence on the GK questionnaire, with participants being 16% more confident on average than they
were accurate. The mean calibration score was .26 (SD
= .07). A calibration curve was constructed with confidence levels being collapsed with the next highest level,
such that 25% and 30% were combined, 35% and 40%
were combined, and so forth. This curve, shown in Figure 1, indicates overconfidence at every level. The
gamma correlations ranged from −1.00 to .80, M = .21,
SD = .28, p < .01.
EM Questionnaire
Overall means of confidence and accuracy indicated
overconfidence on the EM questionnaire as well, with
participants being 19% more confident on average than
they were accurate. The mean calibration score was .28
(SD = .07). Although participants were both more confident and more accurate on the EM questionnaire than
on the GK questionnaire, their global overconfidence
and calibration scores on both questionnaires were very
3

The correct answers to the questions concerning the targets’ physical appearance were established by a pilot
group while viewing the target individuals.
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For the sake of realism, participants also made two lineup
identifications. Because it is not possible to compute withinsubject measures of the C-A relationship for the lineup identifications (unless a very large number of lineups are used), the
lineup results are not reported.
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Figure 1. Calibration curves for the General Knowledge (GK) and Eyewitness
Memory (EM) questionnaires for Experiment 1

similar. A calibration curve was constructed in the same
manner as for the GK scores (see Figure 1). This curve
also shows overconfidence, except at the lowest confidence level, for which there were very few responses.
The gamma correlations ranged from −.14 to .76, M =
.41, SD = .17, p < .01.
Correlation Between GK and EM Questionnaire
Performance
The overall degree of overconfidence was approximately the same in the two domains: 16% for the GK

questionnaire and 19% for the EM questionnaire. Correlations were computed between the two domains for
participants’ mean confidence, mean accuracy, overconfidence, calibration, and gamma correlation (see Table
2). As predicted, significant positive correlations were
found between the GK and EM questionnaires for the
absolute monitoring measures (overconfidence, r = .34,
p < .01; calibration, r = .38, p < .01), as well as the relative monitoring measure of gamma (r = .16, p < .01).
There was also a significant positive correlation for average confidence, r = .33, p < .01, but not for average
accuracy, r = .09.

Table 1. Mean Accuracy, Confidence, Calibration, and Gamma Correlations for Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment 1
GK
Measure
		
Accuracy (%)
Confidence (%)
Correct responses (%)
Incorrect responses (%)
Calibration score
Gamma correlation

M
31
47
52
45
.26
.21

Experiment 2
EM

SD
8
13
15
14
.07
.28

M
55
74
80
68
.28
.41

GK
SD
8
11
11
13
.07
.17

M
47
58
68
50
.25
.41

EM
SD
50
28
8
6
.05
.18

M
50
60
68
52
.26
.42

SD
50
28
8
6
.08
.27

Note. Ns = 117 for Experiment 1 and 96 for Experiment 2. Calibration scores could range from 0 to 1, with lower scores
indicating better calibration. GK = General Knowledge questionnaire; EM = Eyewitness Memory questionnaire.
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Table 2. Correlations (Pearson’s r) Between Performance on the General Knowledge (GK)
and Eyewitness Memory (EM) Questionnaires
Experiment
1
2

Calibration Accuracy
.38**
.32**

Confidence

.09
.16

.33**
.49**

Over/
Underconfidence
.34*
.17*

Gamma
correlation
.16*
.24

Note. Over/underconfidence is the difference of mean confidence minus mean accuracy.
Ns = 117 for Experiment 1 and 96 for Experiment 2.
*p < .05, one-tailed. **p < .001, one-tailed.

Discussion
Consistent with previous research, participants were
overconfident in answering questions about both impersonal facts (e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1982) and personally witnessed events (e.g., Smith et al., 1989). They
were correct on 31% of their answers to GK questions,
yet their mean confidence rating was 47%. Likewise,
they were correct on 55% of their answers to questions
about the witnessed event, yet their mean confidence rating was 74%. Thus, participants were, on average, 16%
and 19% overconfident in the GK and EM domains,
respectively.
Although previous research has found similar degrees of overconfidence in GK and EM (Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Perfect et al., 1993), the stability of participants’ performance across these domains has not been
assessed. The main finding of Experiment 1 is that the
same participants who were good monitors in one domain tended to be good monitors in the other domain as
well. Specifically, the measures of both relative monitoring (i.e., resolution) and absolute monitoring (i.e., overconfidence and calibration) effectiveness were positively
correlated across domains. Of interest, mean confidence
was also positively correlated across domains, whereas
mean accuracy was not. This finding seems to indicate
that participants were merely consistent in their assignment of confidence values, which could account for the
positive correlations for the measures of absolute monitoring effectiveness. Although this interpretation can explain the consistency in absolute monitoring effectiveness, the significant positive correlation for resolution
between the GK and EM domains indicates that participants for whom differences in confidence reliably predicted differences in accuracy on one task also tended
to show good relative monitoring ability on the other

task. Thus, participants were not consistent merely in
their tendency to use similar confidence values across
domains. As a whole, these results suggest that the relationship between an individual’s confidence judgments
and accuracy, in terms of both absolute and relative
monitoring effectiveness, is relatively stable across different tasks (cf. West & Stanovich, 1997).
A practical application of the findings from Experiment 1 would be to present witnesses with feedback,
which they would then be able to take into account
while testifying. The capacity of feedback to ameliorate
the general finding of overconfidence, and potentially to
improve witnesses’ relative monitoring effectiveness as
well, was the primary focus of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, participants were overconfident for
both GK and EM questions. Furthermore, both calibration and resolution were found to be moderately correlated across tasks, suggesting a common underlying
mechanism controlling performance on both tasks. Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether receiving
feedback on GK performance would lead participants to
reduce their overconfidence and become more effective
memory monitors on an independent task involving EM.
The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment
1, but several methodological changes were made in order to clarify and extend the results. First, the nature of
the witnessed event was changed. In Experiment 1, the
witnessed event was a live event that had been combined
with the GK questionnaire (i.e., part of the witnessed
event was the administration of the GK questionnaire).
For Experiment 2, the witnessed event was changed to
a videotaped clip from a movie. This was done both to
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separate the witnessed event from the GK task and to
assess the findings’ generalizability to a different experimental eyewitness context (cf. Tollestrup, Turtle, &
Yuille, 1994).
The next changes from Experiment 1 concerned delay and participant attrition. Because delay did not significantly affect performance on the EM questionnaire in
Experiment 1, only a 2-day delay was used for Experiment 2. Additionally, the manner of recruiting participants was altered slightly (see Participants below), resulting in a reduction in the attrition rate.
In the final change from Experiment 1, prior to answering questions about the witnessed event, some participants received feedback concerning their performance
on the GK questionnaire. Previous studies on the effect
of feedback on the C-A relationship have been mixed,
depending on the measure used. Some studies have
shown that feedback improves resolution but not calibration (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Sharp et al., 1988).
However, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) found the
opposite result, with feedback improving calibration but
not resolution. Subbotin (1996) also found that feedback
improved calibration but only for easy items (resolution
was not examined in this study). In light of these differences, it is difficult to predict whether calibration, resolution, or both would be improved through feedback.
A common finding, however, is that feedback is capable
of improving performance (albeit not consistently in all
respects).
We used two types of feedback: general feedback,
which informed participants of the common findings regarding overconfidence, and specific feedback, which
informed them that they themselves had been overconfident in the first phase of the experiment. We made two
predictions: (a) that feedback would reduce overconfidence in the eyewitness phase of the experiment, compared with a control condition with no feedback, and (b)
that any improvements would be more marked in the
specific feedback condition than in the general feedback
condition. This second prediction was made because of
the heightened relevance of the specific feedback to participants’ own behavior.
It is less clear whether feedback (general or specific) about overconfidence would also improve participants’ calibration and resolution, as it could lead them
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to become less confident without any corresponding improvement in how differences in confidence predict differences in accuracy. However, because the feedback
might have the overall effect of making participants
more thoughtful in using confidence judgments when
monitoring their memory performance, we hypothesized
that it would improve calibration and resolution as well.
As this hypothesis was somewhat tentative, we expected
that the feedback about overconfidence would affect participants’ calibration and resolution less than their degree of over/underconfidence.
Method
Participants
Participants were volunteers from undergraduate psychology courses at Louisiana State University
who signed up to participate in an experiment for extra
course credit. Of the 113 participants who completed the
GK questionnaire in Phase 1 of the study, 17 did not participate in the EM questionnaire in Phase 2, leaving 96
participants for the main analyses. This attrition rate of
15% is much lower than in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 in that
it occurred in two phases. In Phase 1, participants, in
groups of up to 20, viewed a video clip on a 25-in. monitor and then filled out a GK questionnaire. Participants
were instructed to pay close attention to the video because they might be asked about it later. Participants
then came back 2 days later for Phase 2. During the delay, the GK questionnaires were scored, and participants
were assigned to feedback conditions. In Phase 2, participants were given the EM questionnaire concerning
the video, with the first page containing the feedback instructions. Because gains made from feedback have been
found to occur following the first feedback session (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980), only this single instance
of feedback was given.
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Materials and Design
The GK and EM questionnaires were similar in structure to Experiment 1, but different in content. Specifically, the number of questions on both questionnaires
was increased to 50, and the difficulty of the two questionnaires was equated through pilot testing. (The overall accuracy rates for the two questionnaires in Experiment 1 were considerably different—31% for GK, 56%
for EM—though performance in both domains was significantly better than chance.) Furthermore, the witnessed event was changed from a live to a videotaped
event.
At the beginning of the EM questionnaire was an instruction page that contained one of three feedback conditions: specific, general, or no feedback. In the specific
feedback condition, participants were told that their GK
questionnaire had been scored in order to provide feedback and that they had been overconfident in their answers. In the general feedback condition, participants
were told that some of the participants’ GK questionnaires had been scored in order to give them feedback
about their performance but that theirs had not been
scored. They were then told that most people tended to
be overconfident in their answers. The no-feedback (control) instructions simply told participants that the following questions concerned the video they had watched
on the first day. Participant triads were matched on their
calibration scores on the GK questionnaire, with members of each triad randomly assigned to feedback conditions. This matching process ensured that participants in
the different feedback conditions did not differ in their

83

calibration on the GK questionnaire, F(2, 93) = .331, p
> .05.
The witnessed event was a clip about 3½ min long
from a popular film. The clip was chosen because it contained a fair amount of dialogue and no violence. The
correct answers to questions about the film were determined by unanimous agreement among four raters.
Results
The participants’ overall mean accuracy and mean
confidence were computed for each task. These means
are presented in Table 1, which also shows mean confidence levels on the correct and incorrect responses,
mean calibration scores, and mean gamma correlations
for each task.
GK Questionnaire
Overall means of confidence and accuracy indicated
overconfidence on the GK questionnaire, with participants being 11% more confident on average than they
were accurate. The mean calibration score was .25 (SD
= .05). Mean confidence and accuracy were both higher
than in Experiment 1, whereas calibration scores were
about the same. A calibration curve was constructed as
in Experiment 1 (see Figure 2). This curve indicates
overconfidence at every level except the lowest confidence level. The gamma correlations ranged from −.19
to .77, with a mean of .41 (SD = .18), p < .01.

Figure 2. Calibration curves for the General Knowledge (GK) and Eyewitness Memory
(EM) questionnaires for Experiment 2
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EM Questionnaire
Overall performance. Overall means for confidence
and accuracy indicated overconfidence on the EM questionnaire as well, with a mean overconfidence of 10%.
The mean calibration score was .26 (SD = .08). These
figures correspond closely to the GK questionnaire. A
calibration curve (see Figure 2) also shows overconfidence, except at the lowest confidence level. The gamma
correlations ranged from −.64 to 1.0, with a mean of .42
(SD = .27), p < .01.
Feedback. Separate analyses of covariance on eyewitness confidence, accuracy, calibration, gamma, and
over/underconfidence were conducted, with feedback
as a between-subjects factor. Although feedback groups
had been equated for calibration on the GK questionnaire, GK accuracy was included as a covariate in all of
these analyses to control for any possible variations on
this dimension. Type of feedback did not have an effect
on eyewitness accuracy, calibration, or gamma (Fs < 1),
but it did have a significant effect on confidence, F(2,
92) = 8.79, p < .01, and over/underconfidence, F(2, 92)
= 7.56, p = .01. Planned comparisons showed that participants who received either kind of feedback had significantly lower confidence levels than participants who
received no feedback (Ms = 56% vs. 69%), t(93) = 4.46,
p < .01, and were also less overconfident (Ms = 6% vs.
17%), t(93) = 2.72, p < .01. There was no significant difference in confidence between the general (M = 58%)
and specific (M = 54%) feedback conditions, t(93) =
1.09, p > .05; however, participants in the specific feedback condition were marginally less overconfident (Ms
= 2% vs. 10%), t(93) = 1.92, p < .08.
Correlations Between GK and EM Questionnaire
Performance
Because the eyewitness calibration scores and
gamma correlations in Experiment 2 did not differ
across feedback conditions, all three feedback conditions were collapsed for computing correlations between domains (see Table 2). As in Experiment 1,
significant correlations between the GK and EM questionnaires were found for both mean confidence and
overconfidence, r = .49, p < .01, and r = .17, p < .05,
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respectively. The correlation between domains for accuracy was marginally significant, r = .16, p < .07. As
in Experiment 1, there were also significant, positive
correlations between calibration and gamma on the EM
and GK questionnaires, r = .32, p < .01, and r = .24, p
< .01, respectively.
Discussion
The main result of Experiment 2 is the replication
of the significant positive correlations for overconfidence, calibration, and resolution between the GK and
EM questionnaires. A second important finding is that,
compared to those who did not receive any feedback,
participants who were given feedback regarding overconfidence on the GK questionnaire had lower average confidence and overconfidence scores on the EM
questionnaire. This reduction occurred whether the
feedback indicated that they in particular were overconfident or that people in general were overconfident.
However, this reduction in confidence was not accompanied by a corresponding improvement in calibration
or resolution. Feedback that was expressed not just in
terms of overconfidence but that specifically addressed
calibration or resolution, or both, might improve these
measures of monitoring effectiveness as well (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Sharp et al., 1988; Subbotin,
1996).
General Discussion
In the present experiments, the relationship between
participants’ confidence in their memories and the accuracy of those memories was assessed in two different domains: GK and EM. In both experiments, participants’ confidence in their responses exceeded their
accuracy in both domains, supporting previous research
showing that people believe they know more than they
actually do about impersonal facts (e.g., Lichtenstein et
al., 1982) and personally witnessed events (e.g., Smith
et al., 1989; Sporer et al., 1995). More important, the degree to which participants were good monitors was positively correlated in the two domains. Much of this consistency reflected participants’ tendency to use similar
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confidence ratings across domains; that is, participants’
confidence judgments, and not just their degree of overconfidence, were correlated across domains. This consistent use of confidence may account for the stability
of absolute monitoring effectiveness (i.e., calibration
and over/underconfidence) across domains; however, it
cannot explain the stability in participants’ resolution
scores.
The domains used in the present experiments can be
said to draw on distinct memory systems: EM involves
episodic memory, which contains experiential memory of events, whereas GK involves semantic memory,
which contains abstract knowledge of facts (Tulving,
1983). Tulving has catalogued the extensive differences,
as well as the similarities, between these two memory systems. For example, they are proposed to differ in their source and mode of operation, but they are
alike in that they both contain information that is propositional in nature and that can be modified as a result
of mental activity (Tulving, 1983, chap. 3). The results
of the present experiments suggest that another similarity between these two kinds of memory is in people’s
metaknowledge of the information that is held in episodic and semantic memory. The major finding of the
present experiments was that the relationship between
participants’ confidence and accuracy—in the sense of
over/underconfidence, calibration, and resolution—was
consistent across domains. Although metamemory has
been applied primarily to semantic knowledge (Nelson
& Narens, 1990), this finding suggests that it may operate similarly regardless of the type of knowledge that
is being monitored. Although some research has failed
to find much stability in individuals’ metamemory judgments (Nelson, 1988; Thompson & Mason, 1996), both
absolute and relative monitoring ability thus appear to
be relatively stable characteristics in making confidence
judgments across the domains of GK and EM. The stability of metamemory across other tasks also awaits future research.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that witness
overconfidence can be reduced by informing witnesses
that people in general (or they themselves) tend to be
overconfident. Participants who received such feedback
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about their performance on the GK questionnaire were
significantly less confident in their eyewitness reports
than participants who received no feedback. Unfortunately, the feedback did not improve calibration or resolution. In other words, feedback about overconfidence
did not affect how well variations in confidence predicted variations in accuracy, despite having the overall
effect of reducing participants’ confidence.
Although both eyewitnesses and individuals answering questions about impersonal facts vary widely in
how well their subjective confidence matches their actual task performance (Smith et al., 1989; Lichtenstein
et al., 1982; Luus & Wells, 1994a, 1994b), there are
few consistent individual differences in the C-A relationship in either the GK (Koriat et al., 1980; Lichtenstein et al., 1982) or the EM (Deffenbacher, 1991; Hosch, 1994) domain. This dearth of predictors means that
it is difficult to determine the degree to which a given
individual’s confidence is indicative of his or her accuracy. This uncertainty becomes especially problematic
when accuracy—that is, the “right” answer—cannot be
known conclusively, as is frequently the case in eyewitness situations.
A possible solution to the predictability dilemma that
is suggested by the present findings would be to use
performance within one domain to predict performance
within the other. Specifically, something like a GK
questionnaire could be administered to witnesses in an
attempt to predict how overconfident they are likely to
be in reporting details of the witnessed event. Although
jurors are poor judges of eyewitness accuracy (Lindsay, 1994; Wells & Lindsay, 1983), they are nonetheless heavily influenced by eyewitnesses’ reported confidence (Cutler et al., 1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Wells,
Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981). Consequently, they would
benefit most—apart from defendants—from learning
whether a particular witness tends to be over- or underconfident. The confidence statements of witnesses
who were grossly overconfident in responding to GK
questions could then be weighed more cautiously than
the confidence statements of witnesses for whom confidence and accuracy on GK were more closely related.
Such a procedure would capitalize on the finding that
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individuals who are overconfident in one domain tend
to behave similarly in the other domain. Attending to
this fact could therefore correct for witnesses’ general
tendency to be overconfident. Research showing that
jurors are responsive to expert testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness confidence in general (Fox &
Walters, 1986) suggests that they would be sensitive to
evidence of overconfidence in particular witnesses as
well.
This proposal is somewhat limited by the fact that although the correlation between participants’ overconfidence scores in the two domains was statistically significant (rs = .34 in Experiment 1 and .17 in Experiment 2),
it nonetheless means that at most only 12% (according
to the r of .34) of the variation in eyewitnesses’ overconfidence can be explained by the variation in their overconfidence for GK. This is a nontrivial proportion, but
it still means that most of the variance is due to other
factors, which may include individual differences such
as demographic characteristics (Deffenbacher, 1991).
Overconfidence for GK questions may be a reliable predictor of overconfidence in eyewitness reports, but it is
clearly an imperfect one.
In addition to their practical implications, the present
findings have theoretical importance as well. They indicate that there are consistencies in people’s metamemory across different judgment domains (cf. Nelson &
Narens, 1990). Although situational factors play a considerable role in people’s thinking (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), the finding
that overconfidence, calibration, and resolution are stable in individuals across domains supports theories arguing in favor of cognitive styles (e.g., Wapner & Demick,
1991) and the importance of dispositional factors in how
one approaches judgment tasks (Hosch, 1994). Research
is called for that addresses in more detail the personality and cognitive factors that are associated with people’s monitoring abilities in various metamemory judgment tasks.

Berger, J., & Herringer, L. (1991). Individual differences
in eyewitness recall accuracy. Journal of Social Psychology, 131, 807–813.
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